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1 Introduction 
The solution concept used in most applications of noncooperative game theory is Nash 
equilibrium. A mixed strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can increase 
rus payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. Thus, Nash equilibrium presumes 
that players choose their actions independently (Le., they use "mixed" rather than 
"correlated" strategies), and also that the players' behavior is individualistic (Le., 
only "individual" rather than "coordinated" deviations are considered). 
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test whether these 
presumptions are appropriate when, as it is often the case in situations modelled as 
noncooperative games, preplay communication is possible, but binding agreements 
cannot be made. (In a Cournot oligopoly, for example, competitors may be unable to 
enforceably contract output levels due to antitrust regulation, aUhough they may be 
able to freely discuss the outputs they intend to choose.) In the experiment subjects 
communicate by plain conversation prior to playing a simple game. In this setting, 
we find that the presumption of individualistic and independent behavior under1ying 
the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to be 
cooperative and correlated. 1 Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation 
of observed play. The coalition proof equilibrium of the game, however, explains the 
data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced. 
Our experimental results show that preplay communication introduces possibili­
ties for cooperation that may alter the outcome of a game in a fundamental way, and 
therefore that there is a need for solution concepts which account for them. Recently 
a number of such solution concepts have been developed. These concepts presume 
that players behave cooperatively rather than individualistically, although coopera­
tion is limited by the inability of players to commit. Among these, the concepts of 
strong Nash equilibrium (SN E) introduced by Aumann [1], and coalition-proof N ash 
equilibrium (eP N E) developed by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston [5] are perhaps 
1Cooperation may seem paradoxical in noncooperative games. The label "noncooperative," how­
ever, should not be taken to imply that "cooperative" behavior is ruled out, but rather that cooper­
ation is limited by the fact that players cannot make binding commitments, even if they can freely 
discuss their strategies (see Aumann [4]). 
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best known. 
A strategy profile is a SNE if no coalition of players by changing their strategies 
can make its members better off. Hence a SNE is invulnerable to any deviation 
by any coalition. The concept of strong Nash equilibrium may be too strong as it 
requires that an equilibrium be invulnerable even to deviations which are themselves 
vulnerable to further deviations.2 This problem with SNE was recognized by Bern­
heim, Peleg and Whinston [5], who proposed the notion of ePN E: A strategy profile 
is a ePN E if no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation which makes its members 
better off. A deviation is self-enforcing if no proper subcoalition of the deviating 
coalition has a further self-enforcing deviation which makes its members better off. 
These solution concepts maintain the presumption that players choose their ac­
tions independently. When players can communicate, however, this presumption 
may not be appropriate. In the following game, which we refer to as the Three Player 
Matching Pennies Carne (TPMPG), cooperative behavior may give rise to correlated 
play. 
Three players each simultaneously choose heads or tails. If aH three faces 
match, then players 1 and 2 each win a penny while pIayer 3 loses two 
pennies. Otherwise, player 3 wins two pennies while players 1 and 2 each 
lose a penny. 
The matrix representation of the game is given in Figure 1 below, where players 1, 
2, and 3 choose, respectively, the row, the column, and the matrix. 
H T 
H T H T 
H 1,1,-2 -1,-1,2 H -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 
T -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 \ T -1,-1,2 1,1,-2 
Figure 1: the TPMPG 
In this game, players 1 and 2 have completely common interests (either they both 
win a penny or they both lose a penny), and their interests are completely opposed 
2Indeed, in many games (e.g., the prisoners' dilemma) a SNE does not existo 
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to those of player 3 (when they win, pIayer 3 loses two pennies, and when they lose, 
pIayer 3 wins two pennies). If players 1 and 2 can communicate, one would expect 
that they will coordinate their actions (Le., they will both choose heads or both 
choose tails) as they lose whenever their actions do not match. When players 1 and 
2 act as a "team," the game effectively becomes the usual (two pIayer) matching 
pennies game, which has a unique Nash (and unique correlated) equilibrium where 
each "team" chooses heads or tails with equal probability; Le., with probability ! 
players 1 and 2 both choose heads and with probability ! both choose tails, while 
pIayer 3 chooses heads or tails with equal probability. The resulting probability 
distribution over action profiles (Le., correlated strategy) is given in Figure 2. 
H T 
H T H T 
H [ffij¡O H [ffij¡O 
Tal4 Tal4 
Figure 2: the CPCE of the TPMPG 
As this probability distribution is not the product of its marginals, it cannot be 
generated by any mixed strategy profile. Thus, if players can communicate prior to 
play, one should not expect the players to choose their actions independently in this 
game. 
Einy and Peleg [6] (E&P) and Moreno and Wooders [7] (M&W) develop notions 
of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium (CPCE) which not only presume that play­
ers behave cooperatively, but also allow the possibility that cooperation may give 
rise to correlated play. A C PCE is a correlated strategy from which no coalition 
has a self-enforcing deviation which makes its members better off.3 The notion of 
self-enforcingness used is the same as the one implicit in CPNE. Introducing the 
3Since deviations by a single player are always self enforcing, a CPCE must be a correlated 
equilibrium (see Aumann [2],[3]). A correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium if for every action 
profile which is selected with positive probability, no player, knowing the action he is to play, can 
increase his expected payoff by taking a different action. The notion of correlated equilibrium admits 
the possibility of correlated play, although it maintains the presumption of individualistic behavior. 
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possibility of correlated play, however, makes it difficult to determine which devi­
ations are feasible, and what is the appropriate criterion to use in deciding which 
deviations are improving. E&P and M&W take different approaches to resolving 
these difficulties, thereby obtaining different equilibrium notions. For the TPMPG, 
however, both equilibrium notions identify the correlated strategy in Figure 2 as the 
game's unique CPCE. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the experimental game 
and study its equilibria. Section 3 discusses the experimental designo Section 4 
describes the experimental results and performs sorne preliminary tests of alternative 
hypotheses about player behavior. Section 5 studies the implications of ~ntroducing 
errors into the TPMPG. Section 6 is devoted to testing for correlated and cooperative 
behavior and testing whether observed play can be explained by any of the solutions 
concepts discussed when players make errors. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Equilibria of the TPMPG 
Our experimental game is the TPMPG. This game is simple enough that equilibrium 
theory will have a good chance of succeeding in an experimental setting, yet coop­
eration and correlation both play an important role. In this section we describe the 
equilibria of the TPMPG. We establish that the game does not have a CPNE. We 
also establish that although the set of correlated equilibria is large, there is a unique 
CPCE. 
NASH EQUILIBRIA AND COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA 
The pure strategy profiles (H, H, T) and (T, T, H) , and the mixed strategy profile 
where each player chooses heads or tails with equal probability are the only Nash 
equilibria of the TPMPG. In each of the pure Nash equilibria players 1, 2 each lose 
a penny, while player 3 wins two pennies. In the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
players 1 and 2 each obtain a expected payoff of -~, while player 3's expected payoff 
is 1. 
The TPMPG, however, does not have a CPNE. Note that since any deviation by a 
4 
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single player is self-enforcing, then a CPNE must be a Nash equilibrium. None of the 
Nash equilibria is a CPN E: In each of the pure strategy Nash equilibria, the coalition 
of players 1 and 2 by jointly deviating in order to "match" player 3's action-i.e., both 
choosing T in the equilibrium (H, H, T) , and both choosing H in the equilibrium 
(T, T, H)-can each win a penny. Both these deviations are self-enforcing as neither 
player 1 nor player 2 can gain by deviating further. Rence neither (H, H, T) nor 
(T, T, H) is a CPNE. Nor is the mixed Nash equilibrium a CPNE, as the deviation 
in which players 1 and 2 both choose T is also improving (players 1 and 2 obtain a 
payoff of O) and self-enforcing. Therefore the TPMPG has no CPNE.4 
COALITION-PROOF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA 
We establish now that the correlated strategy in Figure 2, denoted by p*, is the 
unique CPCE of the TPMPG. This is established by first showing that self-enforcing 
deviations by either pIayer 3 or by the coalition of players 1 and 2 rule out any other 
correlated strategy as a possible CPCE: only the correlated strategy P* is immune 
to these deviations.It is then shown that this strategy is indeed a CPCE. 
Let P be an arbitrary correlated strategy, and write Pijk for the probability of 
action profile (i,j, k) E {H, T}3. 8ince pis a probability distribution, it satisfies 
PHHH +PHTH +PTHH +PTTH +PHHT +PHTT +PTHT +PTTT = 1, (1) 
and Pijk 2 O for each (i, j, k) E {H, T}3 . Let Ui (p) denote the expected payoff of 
player i when action profiles are selected according to the correlated strategy p. We 
have 
U3(p) 
U1(p) = U2(p) = --2- = PHHH-PHTH-PTHH-PTTH-PHHT-PHTT-PTHT+PTTT· 
(2) 
Assume that P is a CPCE of the TPMPG. Consider the deviation by player 3 in 
which he chooses H. When players 1 and 2 continue to choose their actions according 
to P, then the probability that they both choose H is PHHH +PHHT; in this case pIayer 
4A SN E is always a ePNE since a SNE is invulnerable to improving deviations, self-enforcing 
or otherwise, by any coalition of players. Therefore, the TPMPG does not have a SNE either. 
5 
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3 loses two pennies. For every other pair of actions chosen by players 1 and 2, player 
3 wins two pennies. Thus, by deviating to H player 30btains 
2(-PHHH - PHHT + PHTH + PTHH + PTTH + PHTT + PTHT + PTTT)' 
Since this deviation by player 3 cannot be improving, P must satisfy 
2( -PHHH - PHHT + PHTH + PTHH + PTTH + PHTT + PTHT + PTTT) ::; U3(p). (3) 
Also, since a deviation by player 3 to T cannot be improving either, P must satisfy 
2(-PTTT - PTTH + PHHH + PHTH + PTHH + PHHT + PHTT + PTHT) S; U3(p). (4) 
We now study the constraints imposed on P by the possibility of deviations by 
the coalition of players 1 and 2. Note that in the TPMPG players 1 and 2 only win 
when they both choose the same face; thus, any deviation by the coalition of both 
players is self-enforcing so long as it prescribes that both players choose the same 
action, as in this case no player can benefit by deviating further. Consider the (self­
enforcing) deviation by the coalition of players 1 and 2 in which they both choose H 
with probability one. When player 3 continues to choose his action according to P, 
then the probability that he chooses H is PHHH + PHTH + PTHH + PTTH; in this case 
players 1 and 2 each win a penny. In any other case (Le., when player 3 chooses T) 
players 1 and 2 each lose a penny. Thus, if players 1 and 2 deviate to both choosing 
H, each obtains 
PHHH + PHTH + PTHH + PTTH - PHHT - PHTT - PTHT - PTTT· 
Since this deviation cannot be improving, P must satisfy 
PHHH + PHTH + PTHH + PTTH - PHHT - PHTT - PTHT - PTTT ::; U1(p) = U2 (p). (5) 
As the deviation in which players 1 and 2 both choose T with probability one cannot 
be improving either, P must satisfy also 
PHHT + PHTT + PTHT + PTTT - PHHH - PHTH - PTHH - PTTH ::; U1(p) = U2 (p)· (6) 
It is straightforward to check that p" is the unique correlated strategy satisfying 
conditions (1) through (6); Le., "incentive compatibility constraints" rule out every 
6 
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correlated strategy but p*. Thus, if p* is a CPCE, then it is the unique CPCE of 
the TPMPG. 
It is established that p* is a CPCE by showing that no coalition of players has an 
improving deviation. ClearIy, neither player 1 nor player 2 can improve by unilateraHy 
deviating as they both lose whenever they choose different actions. Because p* satisfies 
the inequalities (3) and (4), pIayer 3 cannot improve either by unilateraHy deviating. 
(Rence p* is a correlated equilibrium.) Moreover, as playér 3's interests are completely 
opposed to those of player 1 and pIayer 2, no coalition of more than one pIayer which 
includes pIayer 3 has a deviation which is improving for aH its members. Further, 
when player 3's action is selected according to p* he chooses heads or tails with equal 
probability; hence players 2 and 3 obtain at most a payoff of zero from any deviation. 
Since they already obtain a payoff of zero when action profiles are selected according 
to p*, the coalition of players 1 and 2 does not have an improving deviation either. 
Thus, p* is the unique CPCE of the TPMPG.5 
Experimental Design 
In the version of the TPMPG played in the experiment, each player chose either 
circle or square. We adopted these labels for the strategies as the labels "Reads" and 
"Tails" are suggestive of randomization. A subject's role in the game was indicated 
by one of the colors "Blue," "Red," or "White." The game was described to the 
subjects as foHows: If aH three players choose the same figure (that is, if aH three 
choose circle or aH three choose square), then the Blue and the Red player each earn 
$7.50 and the White player earns $0. In any other case, the Blue and the Red player 
each earn $0 and the White player earns $15.00. Subjects played the game only once. 
Subjects were recruited in groups of twelve for sessions lasting one hour.6 None 
of the subjects had previously participated in the experimento Prior to the subjects 
entering the lab, twelve computers were "linked" by software to form four groups of 
SIt is worth noting that this strategy is in fact a "strong correlated equilibrium," as it is immune 
to any deviation (self-enforcing or otherwise) by any coalition. 
6In 7 sessions only 9 subjects participated due to "no shows." 
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three computers. Each subject was seated at one of these computers. The game was 
played anonymously as subjects did not know which computers where in the same 
group. 
In order to provide the subjects with the rich communication opportunities pre-
sumed by the notions of coalition-proofness we discuss, each subject was able to com-
rnunicate both publicly and privately with the other rnernbers of his group. Subjects 
used their computers to cornmunicate for 15 minutes before choosing their actions. 
To facilitate this communication, each subject's computer screen was divided into 
three windows. A label at the top of each window indicated which players could send 
messages to that window and which players could see that window's messages. 
A Blue player, for example, had windows labelled "Blue-Red," "Blue-White," and 
"Blue-Red-White." A Blue player could cornrnunicate privately with the Red (White) 
player in his group by exchanging rnessages in the "Blue-Red" ("Blue-White") win-
dow. A Blue player communicated publicly through the "Blue-Red-White" window.7 
The screen of a Blue player, before any messages have been exchanged, is displayed 
in Figure 3. 
-1 Blue-Red Blue-'W'hlte Blue-Red-Whlte 
I !:Nnmp.Pl. fdlt .comment .Edlt ,Comment Edlt 
Blut-WhIlt1'" "oo," 
1- - -
I=~==;-:~=~;;;-;:~~~~ ~•••~.~~.~~--=;~;;:~=-:~~ 
.- ..-.....
...'" \,1,(1. 
-
Figure 3: A Blue player's screen 
7A Red player had windows labelled "Blue-Red," "Red-White," and "Blue-Red-White," while a 
\Vhite player had windows labelled "Blue-White," "Red-White," and "Blue-Red-White." 
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The mechanics of exchanging messages were simple. To send a message to a 
particular window, a subject activated it by using his mouse to point and click on it. 
The subject then composed his message, which was displayed in the lower box of the 
window as it was typed. The message was sent when the subject used his mouse to 
point and click on the .s.ubmit button at the bottom of the window. A message sent 
to a window was then displayed on the screens of aH the players listed in the window's 
label. A message sent to the "BIue-Red" window, for example, was displayed in the 
"BIue-Red" window of the screens of both the BIue and the Red playero Whenever 
a player sent a message, a tag was automaticaHy attached which identified his color. 
The tag also indicated the hour and minute that the message was sent. (A transcript 
of players' dialog in one of the sessions is given in Appendix B. In this transcript, 
the first message in the BIue-Red, Red-White, and BIue-Red-White windows were 
practice messages. The time spent exchanging these messages was not included in 
the 15 minutes of the communication phase.) 
ANONYMITY 
The solution concepts we discuss apply to situations where the players of the game 
cannot make binding agreements. Therefore, preserving the anonymity of subjects 
throughout the experiment was an essential feature of the experimental designo Had 
. subjects not been anonymous, reneging on agreements would be costly and, in that 
case, agreements are no longer entirely non-binding. Anonymity also had the impor-
tant role of eliminating the possibility of credible promises of side payments. In order 
to preserve anonymity, subjects were instructed that they were not to send messages 
in which they identified themselves. They were also told that their messages would 
be monitored to insure that they did not identify themselves. No other constraints 
were placed on the content of messages. 
EXPECTED UTILITY AND EXPECTED MONETARY PAYOFF 
The TPMPG has only two outcomes; either the figures of aH three players are the 
same (a "win" for the BIue and the Red player and a "loss" for the White player), 
or they are not aH the same (a win for the White pIayer and a loss for the BIue and 
9 
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Red player). Therefore, provided that each player prefers the outcome where he wins 
(and obtains a higher monetary payoff in this case), and provided that each player's 
preferences over lotteries can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function, we can take monetary payoffs to be utility payoffs. Since payoffs in the 
experimental game can be obtained by positive affine transformations of the payoffs 
of the version of the TPMPG presented in the Introduction, the equilibria of these 
games are the same. 
The Experimental Data 
In the game, each player had two actions, circle (e) or square (S). An action profile 
is a triple (i, j, k) in the set {e, sp of possible action profiles, where i, j, and k 
denote, respectively, the action of the BIue (row), Red (column), and White (matrix) 
playero Table 1 presents the empirical frequency of each action profile after 69 plays 
of the TPMPG.8 The number in parentheses below each frequency is the number of 
times that profile was observed. 
TABLE 1 
Empírical Frequency Distribution 
e S 
e S e S 
e 
.261 
(18) 
.072 
(5) 
e 
.217 
(15) 
.029 
(2) 
S 
.014 
(1) 
.188 
(13) 
S 
.029 
(2) 
.188 
(13) 
BIue and Red players won in 31 of 69 plays, a win frequency which is not significantly 
different from one half, the win frequency implied by the epeE of the game. In 
the mixed Nash equilibrium this win frequency is only 25%, and in either of the pure 
8The frequencies do not add up to one due to rounding. 
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Nash equilibria it is 0%. The hypothesis that this win frequency is 25% is rejected 
for degrees of significance as small as 0.005. Of course, the hypothesis that this win 
frequency is 0% is rejected at any level of significance. Blue players chose circle in 40 
of the plays, while Red and White players chose circle in 36 and 37 plays, respectively. 
Each player's frequency of circle is not, however, statistically significantIy different 
from one half. 
Next we investigate whether our data is consistent with the presumption of inde-
pendent behavior underlying the concepts of Nash equilibrium, CPNE, and SNE. 
Throughout we conduct hypothesis tests using the "likelihood ratio test." Our data 
can be regarded as a sequence of independent realizations of a multinomial random 
variable whose values are the set of possible action profiles. For each action profile 
(i,j, k) E {C, S}3, denote by Pijk its probability. A sample can be represented by 
a vector n = (nijk)ijkE{C,SP' where each nijk is the number of times action profile 
(i,j, k) was observed. AIso denote by N the number of observations in a sample (Le., 
N = ¿ijkE{C,SP nijk)' The likelihood that a given sample n has been generated by 
the multinomial P = (Pijk)ijkE{C,SP is given by 
nijkL P = a Pijk ,() rr 
ijkE{C,SP 
where a = 11 N! .. ,. The log of the likelihood function is therefore given by 
ijkE{C,S}3 n"k' 
l (p) = In a + ¿ nijk lnpijk. (7) 
ijkE{C,SP 
We first consider the null hypothesis that al1 three players chose their actions 
independently against the alternative hypothesis that they did not (Le., that the 
sample has been generated by an arbitrary multinomial distribution). Dnder the 
nul1, the maximum likelihood estimator of Pijk is 
where ni.., n.j., and n .. k are the number of times that Blue players chose action i, 
Red players chose action j, and White players chose action k, respectively; Le., 
ni.. = ¿jkE{C,SP nijk, n.j. = ¿ikE{C,SP nijk, and n ..k = ¿ijE{C,SP nijk· The maxi-
mum likelihood estimator of Pijk under the alternative hypothesis that the data has 
11 
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been generated by an arbitrary multinomial distribution is 
The likelihood ratio, given by 
is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with 4 degrees of freedom. The degrees 
of freedom is the difference between the dimension of the parameter space under 
the alternative hypothesis (7 in this case) and under the null hypothesis (3 in this 
case). For a given degree of significance a, we can calculate a value such that with 
probability 1 - a a chi-square with 4 degrees of freedom is less than or equal this 
value. We reject the null hypothesis whenever the likelihood ratio is greater than this 
value. Tests of pairwise independence are constructed in a similar fashion. 
The results of likelihood ratio tests of independence of players' actions are given 
in Table 2 below. (The column X6.os provides a value such that if the likelihood ratio 
exceeds this value, then the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 significance level; 
the number in parentheses indicates the degrees of freedom of the chi square.) 
TABLE 2 
Likelihood Ratio Tests of Independence 
Null: Independence of Players' Actions 2Xo.os Likelihood Ratio 
Blue-Red-White 9.49 (4) 40.71 
Blue-White 3.84 (1) 0.58 
Red-White 3.84 (1) 0.02 
Blue-Red 3.84 (1) 339.70 
The hypothesis that the actions of all three players are independent is rejected 
at the 0.05 significance level. In fact, it is rejected for significance levels as small as 
0.005. The source of this rejection is the apparent correlation in the actions of Blue 
and Red players; the hypothesis that the Blue and Red players choose their actions 
independently is rejected at significance levels as small as 0.005. The hypotheses of 
12 
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pairwise independence between Blue and White and between Red and White are not 
rejected at the 0.05 level oí significance. 
Although these results are inconsistent with the presumption oí independence im-
plicit in the concept oí Nash equilibrium, one cannot conclude that play is inconsistent 
with the predictions oí Nash equilibrium on the basis oí these tests alone. Different 
Nash equilibria in different plays oí the game could lead to the appearance oí corre-
lation, even ií actions in any given play were independent. In Section 6 we test this 
hypothesis. The results oí the tests oí independence, however, are consistent with 
the prediction oí coalition-prooí correlated equilibrium that Blue and Red players 
correlate their actions, and that the actions oí Blue and Red players are uncorrelated 
with the actions oí White players. 
In the TPMPG, when players choose their actions cooperatively rather than indi-
vidualistical1y, then Blue and Red players always coordinate their actions. Indeed, in 
59 plays the Blue and the Red player chose the same figure. Nonetheless, Blue and 
Red players íailed to coordinate in 10 plays, which is inconsistent with CPCE unless 
players make errors. In the next section we present a model oí play in the TPMPG 
which admits this possibility. 
The TPMPG with Errors 
In experimental settings there are a number oí elements that might lead a player to 
choose an action different írom the one he intended: a pIayer may misunderstand the 
rules oí the experimental game, or he may simply make an error. In our experiment, 
there is also the possibility that a player's choice oí an action may be based on a 
"miscommunication" (i.e., a message may be misinterpreted, the source oí a mes-
sage may be coníused, or a message may be sent to a player different írom the one 
intended). A theory which ignores the possibility oí errors might be rejected, even 
though it correct1y predicts "intended behavior." 
We introduce the possibility oí errors into the TPMPG by assuming that when a 
pIayer selects a figure, with probability 1-E he chooses the figure he intended, but with 
probability E he chooses a figure randomly (i.e., he chooses "square" or "circle" with 
13 
equal probability). We assume that aH players make errors with the same probability, 
that the errors of players are independent, and that the error structure is common 
knowledge. 
The TPMPG combined with errors by players yields a new game which we denote 
by TPMPG(€). In this new game, apure strategy for a player is interpreted as 
the action he intends to play. The payoff of each player for each profile of intended 
actions is given in Figure 4 below, where w = 7.5pw (€) , and l = 7.5pl (€) . The term 
Pw(€) = 1 - ~€ + ~€2 is the probability that aH the players choose the same figure 
when aH the players intend to choose the same figure, and Pl(€) = !€ - i-€2 is this 
probability when one of the players intends to choose a figure different from the figure 
of another player. 
e s 
e 
S 
e 
w,W, (15 -
l,l,(15-2l) 
2w) 
s 
l, l, (15 - 2l) 
l, l, (15 - 2l) 
e 
e l, l, (15 -
S l, l, (15 -
2l) 
2l) 
s 
l, l, (15 -
w, w, (15 -
2l) 
2w) 
Figure 4: the TPMPG(€) 
For error rates € less than one, the payoffs in the TPMPG(€) can be obtained by 
positive affine transformations of the payoffs in the original TPMPG, and therefore 
the equilibria of these games are the same. 
In the TPMPG(€), however, it is necessary to make a distinction between intended 
actions and actual actions (Le. the actions that are observed). The probability dis-
tribution over intended actions is generaHy different from the probability distribution 
over actual actions, the latter distribution depending on the error rateo Thus, al-
though the equilibria of the TPMPG and TPMPG(€) are the same, the probability 
distributions over profiles of actual actions corresponding to these equilibria are gen-
eraHy different. (An exception is the mixed Nash equilibrium.) 
NASH EQUILIBRIA üF THE TPMPG WITH ERRüRS 
Each of the Nash equilibria gives rise to a probability distribution over actual 
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action profiles of the form given in Figure 5 below.9 The probabilities Pk differ 
for each of the equilibria: when the players intend to play the pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium (8,8, C), then Pk = (~)k(1- ~)3-k; when they intend to play the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium (C,C, 8), then Pk = (~)3-k(1_ ~)k; final1y, if the players 
intend to play the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, then Pk = l. 
C 8 
C 8 C 8 
C~ C~
 
8 [;];] 8 [;I;] 
Figure 5: Nash equilibria in the TPMPG (€) 
CPCE OF THE TPMPG WITH ERRORS 
In the CPCE of the TPMPG(€), with probability ! the Blue and the Red player 
both intend to choose square and with probability ! they both intend to choose 
circle, whíle the White player intends to choose each figure with equal probability. 
The probability distribution over actual action profiles is given in Figure 6, where 
8= € (1 - ~) is the probability that the Blue and the Red players faíl to coordinate 
their actions. 
C 8 
C 8 C 8 
C 1-6-4- 6 4" C 1-6-4-
6 
4" 
8 6 ;¡ 1-6-4- 8 6 ;¡ 1-6-4-
Figure 6: CPCE in the TPMPG 
Unlike the probability distribution over intended action profiles (see Figure 2), the 
probability distribution over actual action profiles gives each outcome a positive prob-
ability. Hence when players make errors, the likelihood of any finite sample is positive 
under the hypothesis that players play the CPCE of the game. Thus, we can no 
longer automatical1y reject this hypothesis if there is a coordination failure. 
9The labels e and S in this table now represent actual (Le., observed) actions, whereas in Figure 
4 they represented intended actions. 
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6 Tests oí Hypotheses in the TPMPG with errors 
In this section we analyze the experimental data in the context of the TPMPG(€). 
We test the underIying assumptions of the alternative solution concepts (Le., inde-
pendent versus correlated behavior, and individualistic versus cooperative behavior), 
and also we test alternative equilibrium theories. Our hypothesis tests are based on 
the likelihood ratio test. We begin by deriving the likelihood function for each of the 
hypothesis of interest. Henceforth denote by (h = (~)k(l_ ~)3-k, the probability that 
exactly k players choose an action different from the one intended. 
INDEPENDENT BEHAVIOR 
In section 4 we reported the results of tests of independence of the players' (actual) 
actions. The presumption of independence in the TPMPG(€) pertains to players 
intended actions rather than to their actual play. It is easy to check, however, that 
since players make errors independently, whenever players intend to choose their 
actions independently, then actual actions are also independent. Hence incorporating 
the possibility that players make errors does not increase the maximum likelihood 
under the hypothesis of independence, and the results of tests of independence for 
the TPMPG(€) are the same as those reported in Section 4 for the TPMPG. 
COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR 
As we discussed in Section 4, cooperative behavior in the TPMPG results in BIue 
and Red players always choosing the same action. Thus, under the null hypothesis 
of cooperative behavior, intended actions are selected according to a multinomial 
distribution P = (Pijk\jkE{e,Sp satisfying 
Pece +Pees + psse +psss = 1. 
In this case, actual actions are selected according to the multinomial p given by 
where -,r = S if r = C, and -,r = C if r = S. 
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The likelihood of our data under the hypothesis of cooperative behavior is obtained 
by replacing these probabilities in equation (7). 
NA8H EQUILIBRIUM 
As the TPMPG has multiple Nash equilibria, an appropriate test for whether 
our data has been generated by Nash equilibrium play must allow the possibility 
that observed play is the result of a "mixture" of Nash equilibria. When the pure 
strategy Nash equílibria (S, S, C) and (C, C, S) have generated a proportion Al and 
A2 of the observed plays, respectively, and the mixed Nash equilibrium has generated 
the remaining observed plays, the probability distribution over actual actions is of 
the form in Figure 5, where 
¿From this multinomial distribution one can calculate the log likelihood function 
using equation (7). For our data this function is 
ZNE (Al ,A2, €) = In a + 13ln Po + 19ln PI + 22 In P2 + 15ln P3. 
COALITION-PROOF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 
The probability distribution over actual action profiles that results when players 
choose their actions according to the coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of the 
TPMPG(€) is described in Figure 6. Given a sample n, denote by NF the number of 
observations where the Blue and the Red players faíl to coordinate their actions (Le., 
NF = ncsc + nscc + nscs + ncss). Using equation (7), one can calculate the log 
likelihood that the observed data has been generated by the CPCE of the game as 
CPCE 8 ( ) 1 - 8Z (€)=lna+NF ln"4+ N-NF In--.4
Thus, under the null hypothesis that our data has been generated by the CPCE, 
the likelihood of a sample depends only on the error rate, the sample size, and the 
number of coordination failures by Blue and Red players. For our sample, the likeli-
hood function is 
8 1-8 
ZCPCE (€) = lna + 10 In "4 + 59 In -4-' 
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RESULTS 
The results of our tests. are presented in Table 3 below. (As before, the column 
X~.os gives a value such that if the likelihood ratio exceeds this value, then the null hy-
pothesis is rejected at the 0.05 significance level; the number in parentheses indicates 
the degrees of freedom.) The first row contains the maximum likelihood estimate of 
the error rate and the value of the likelihood ratio under the null hypothesis of coop-
erative behavior. At the 0.05 significance level we faíl to reject this null hypothesis. 
Thus, the presence of coordination failures in our data can be explained as the result 
of players' errors. 
TABLE 3 
Tests of Hypotheses in the TPMPG(€) 
Null Hypothesis 2Xo.os € Likelihood Ratio 
Cooperative Behavior1O 7.82 (3) 0.155 3.118 
Mixture of NEl1 9.49 (4) 0.5404 34.60 
CPCE 12.59 (6) 0.1573 4.42 
The second row contains the maximum likelihood estimate of the error rate and 
the value of the likelihood ratio under the null hypothesis that the data has been 
generated by a mixture of the three Nash equilibria, against the alternative that the 
data has been generated by sorne arbitrary multinomial distribution. According to 
the likelihood ratio test, this null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level of significance; 
in fact, it is rejected for levels of significance as small as 0.005. Although we do not 
report the tests here, each of the null hypotheses that the data has been generated 
by the mixed or either of the pure Nash equilibria of the game is also rejected. 
lOThe maximum likelihood estimates of Pccc,Pccs,Pccs, and Pssc are, respectively, 0.32,0.23, 
0.24, and 0.21. These estimates were obtained by a grid search over the parameter space. 
llThe maximum likelihood estimates of the other parameters are ~l = 0.55, and ~2 = 0.44. The 
estimated weight on the mixed Nash equilibrium is zero (~l and ~2 do not sum to 1 due to rounding). 
These estimates were obtained by a grid search over the parameter space. 
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The third row of Table 3 shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation 
of the error rate, and the value of the likelihood ratio under the null hypothesis that 
the data was generated by the CPCE of the TPMPG(€). The maximum likelihood 
estimator of the error rate is 
(The second order condition for a maximum is that NF < ~, a condition which is 
satisfied by our data.) According to the likelihood ratio test we fail to reject this 
hypothesis at the 0.05 significance level. In fact, we fail to reject this hypothesis for 
significance levels as large as 0.5. 
The failure to reject the null hypothesis that the data has been generated by the 
CPCE of the TPMPG(€) against the alternative that it has been generated by an 
arbitrary multinomial distribution is very robust with respect to the error rateo The 
curve in Figure 7 below shows the value of the likelihood ratio as a function of the 
error rateo 
24 
22 
20 
::t 
141If
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Figure 7: Likelihood Ratio for CPCE as a function of € 
A horizontalline has been drawn at the value 12.59 (A chi-square with 6 degrees of 
freedom is less than 12.59 with probability 0.95). At a 0.05 significance level, we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that the data has been generated by the CPCE of the 
TPMPG(€) for a large range of error rates (any rate in the interval [0.054,0.353]). 
Although we do not report these tests, one cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the data has been generated by the C PCE of the game against the alternative 
hypothesis that it has been generated by an arbitrary correlated equilibrium. (This 
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alternative is more restrictive than the previously considered alternative that the data 
was generated by an arbitrary multinomial distribution.) We continue to reject the 
null hypothesis that the data has been generated by a mixture of the Nash equilibria 
even with this more restrictive alternative. 
In summary, our experimental data provides support to the hypothesis of coop-
erative behavior, and it strongly rejects the presumption of independent behavior. 
Moreover, it supports the hypothesis that the data has been generated by play of 
the coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of the game, while it clearly rejects the 
hypothesis of Nash equilibrium play. We should note also that although the experi-
ment does not allow one to test the predictive power of the notions of coalition-proof 
Nash equilibrium or strong Nash equilibrium (neither type of equilibria exists for the 
TPMPG), it provides sorne evidence against these theories as both fail to identify 
a coalition-proof equilibrium even though there is an intuitively compelling one, the 
C PCE of the game, which is supported by the data. 
Conclusions 
The results of our experiment stress the importance of accounting for cooperation 
in noncooperative games with preplay communication. Moreover, the experiment 
strongly suggests that cooperative behavior naturally leads to correlated play. In-
deed, in many applications of noncooperative games the situations under stlldy are 
ones where the players have rich opportunities to communicate prior to play. In 
these applications, the use of Nash equilibrium as "the" solution concept may not 
be appropriate. 12 Instead, one should investigate the behavior predicted by solution 
concepts that account for the cooperation possibilities there might be. 
An alternative approach to dealing with preplay communication is to transform 
the game, introducing explicitIy any opportunities to communicate the players might 
have. There are two potential difficulties with this approach: First, it might sim-
ply be infeasible when opportunities to communicate are very rich and unstructured. 
12Except for dominance solvable games, for which Nash, C PN E 1 correlated, and C PCE coincide 
(see Moreno and Wooders [8]). 
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(With "plain conversation", for example, there is no prespecified order in which mes-
sages may be sent and no restriction on the content of messages.) Second, even when 
communication opportunities are limited and structured, and therefore they can be 
modelled explicitIy, taking the Nash equilibria of the transformed game as the pre-
diction of play ignores any cooperation possibilities that communication might bring 
about. Moreover, this approach leads to very weak predictions: For any Nash equi-
librium of the original game there is a Nash equilibrium of the transformed game 
where the players choose their messages arbitrarily and then, ignoring all messages, 
choose actions according to a Nash equilibrium of the original game. 
A feasible and perhaps more practical approach is to devise solution concepts 
which account for communication opportunities implicitIy. Moreover, this approach 
might lead to stronger predictions. (In the TPMPG, for example, there is a continuum 
of correlated equilibria, but only one coalition-proof correlated equilibrium.) The 
notions of coalition-proof equilibrium developed by Einy and Peleg [6] or Moreno and 
Wooders [7] predict well in simple games like the TPMPG, but in general games they 
are subject to criticismo It will be important to design solution concepts which are 
not subject to these criticisms. 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
To control for the possiblity that the order of the presentation of the examples 
may introduce bias in the play, we used two sets of instructions which differed in the 
order the examples were presented, but did not differ in any other respecto We could 
not reject the hypothesis that the data generated using different sets of instructions 
carne from the same probability distribution. 
Instructions 
If at any time you have a question as I go through these instruction, please raise 
your hand. During this experiment, you may not speak to other participants. 
In this experiment, you and the other participants have been divided into groups of 
three players. You will playa simple game with the other two members of your group. 
In every group there is one "Blue," one "Red," and one "White" playero (Please turn 
over the envelop at your station. The color of the sticker on the envelope at your 
station tells you which type of pIayer you are.) Your monetary earnings from playing 
the game are determined by your color and the choices made by the players in your 
group. 
You will play the game only once! 
COMMUNICATION 
Before making your choice, you will have the opportunity to communicate with 
the other members of your group. You communicate by using your computer to send 
and receive messages. To help you do this, the screen in front of you is divided into 
three windows. You can send messages to any of these windows. The label at the top 
of a window tells you which players in your group can see that window's messages. 
In order to show you how you can send messages, you will send a practice message. 
Instructions for BLUE PLAYERS 
If you are a Blue player, your screen displays the three windows shown on the over-
head. These windows are labelled "Blue-Red," "Blue-White" and "Blue-Red-White." 
(If you are a Blue pIayer and your screen does not show these windows, please raise 
your hand.) 
You can send messages to any window on your screen. Only you and the Red 
pIayer in your group can see messages in the Blue-Red window. Only you and the 
White pIayer in your group can see messages in the Blue-White window. All three 
players in your group can see messages in the Blue-Red-White window. 
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You will now send a practice message to the Red player (but not the White player) 
in your group. If you are a BIue player, please do the following. 
(1) Use your mouse to point and click on the lower box in the Blue-Red win-
dowj 
(2) type "Hi, this is a message te Red." 
(3) Use your mouse to point and click on the S,ubmit button at the bottom of 
the Blue-Red window. 
Your screen now appears as displayed on the overhead. The message you just typed 
is displayed in your Blue-Red window. 
You can send messages to White (but not to Red) from the Blue-White window, 
and you can send messages to both Red and White from the Blue-Red-White window. 
Instructions to RED PLAYERS 
If you are a Red player, your screen displays windows labelled "Blue-Red," "Red-
White" and "Blue-Red-White," as shown in the overhead. (If you are a Red piayer 
and your screen does not show these windows, please raise your hand.) 
Notice that themessage just typed by the BIue piayer appears in your Blue-Red 
window. At the end of the message is a label which identifies BIue as the sender of 
the message. 
You will now send a practice message to the White player (but not the BIue 
player) in your group. If you are a Red player, please do the following. 
(1) Use your mouse to point and click on the lower box in the Red-White 
windowj 
(2) type "Hi, this is a message te White." 
(3) Use your mouse to point and click on the S,ubmit button in the Red-White 
window. 
Your screen now appears as displayed on the overhead. Your message to White is 
displayed in your Red-White window. 
You can send messages to BIue (but not to White) from the Blue-Red window, and 
you can send messages to both BIue and White from the Blue-Red-White window. 
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Instructions to WHITE PLAYERS 
If you are a White player, your screen should display the three windows shown in 
the overhead. The windows are labelled "Blue-White," "Red-White," and "Blue-Red-
White." (If you are a White player and your screen does not show these windows, 
please raise your hand.) 
Notice that the message just typed by the Red player appears in your Red-White 
window. 
You will now send a practice message to both the Blue and the Red player in your 
group. If you are a White player, please do the following. 
(1) Use your mouse to point and click on the lower box in the Blue-Red-White 
window 
(2) type "Hi, this is a message to both the other players." 
(3) Use your mouse to point and click on the ~ubmit button in the Blue-Red-
White window. 
Your screen now appears as displayed on the overhead. Your message appears in 
your Blue-Red-White window. Your message also is displayed in the Blue-Red-White 
window of the Blue and the Red player in your group. 
You can send messages to Blue (but not to Red) from the Blue-White window, 
and you can send messages to Red (but not to Blue) from the Red-White window. 
In this experiment you will remain anonymous. As preserving anonymity is im-
portant, you may not send messages that in any way identify yourself. You 
may not, for example, send a message which gives your name or your phone number. 
The messages you send will be monitored inorder to insure that yon do not identify 
yourself. 
The Game: Choices and Earnings 
If you have a question as 1 read through the remaining instructions, please raise 
you hand and a monitor will approach you to answer your question. 
Please open the envelope at your station. Inside you will find a sheet of paper. On 
the side labelled "Record Sheet," please copy the number on your bingo ball in the 
space for "Subject ID." Keep the ball as it is the only way in which we can identify 
you. 
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I will now describe the game that you play with the other members of your group. 
In the game, each player chooses either "circle" or "square." Your earnings are 
determined according to the foHowing rules: 
• If aH three players in your group choose the same figure (that is, if aH three 
choose "circle" or aH three choose "square"), then 
- Blue earns $7.50. 
- Red earns $7.50 
- White earns $0. 
• If any player in your group chooses a figure different from another pIayer , then 
- Blue earns $0. 
- Red earns $0. 
- White earns $15. 
These rules are summarized by the foHowing tableo (A copy of this table is on the 
other side of your record sheet.) 
Choices Earnings 
Blue Red White Sarne Figures? Blue Red White 
O O O Ves $7.50 $7.50 $0 
O O O No $0 $0 $15 
O O O No $0 $0 $15 
O O O Ves $7.50 $7.50 $0 
O O O No $0 $0 $15 
O D D No $0 $0 $15 
n O O No $0 $0 $15 
O O O No $0 $0 $15 
If aH the players in your group choose "circle," then aH have chosen the same 
figure. The first row of the table shows that, in this case, Blue earns $7.50, Red 
earns $7.50, and White earns $0. If Blue chooses "square," Red chooses "circle," and 
White chooses "square" then aH three players have not chosen the same figure. The 
last row shows that, in this case, Blue and Red each earn $0 and White earns $15. 
If you have any questions regarding how your earnings are determined, please 
raise your hand now. 
The experiment proceeds as foHows. 
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• Before making your choice, you will have 15 minutes to communicate with the 
other members of your group. 
• After 15 minutes, you will make your choice. 
• Once earnings are computed you will be called by your subject ID, one person 
at a time, to collect your earnings. At that time you will be told the choices of 
the other players in your group. 
• You will then immediately exit the lab. 
REMEMBER: You will play the game only once and you may not send messages 
which identify yourself. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. 
[Subjects communicated for fifteen minutes.] 
The communication phase is now over. Please turn off your monitor. 
• Please make your choice by checking either the circle or the square on your 
record sheet. 
• Put your record sheet back into the envelop. 
[Record sheets were collected.] 
While we determine your earnings, we ask you to take a short quiz to test whether 
you understand how your earnings are determined. 
• Write your subject ID on the quiz where indicated. 
• For the given choices, write the earnings of each player. Your answers to the 
quiz will not affect your earnings. 
[Quizzes were collected.] 
Please wait at your station until your subject ID is called. 
• When you are called, take your bingo ball to the back of the room to collect 
your earnings. 
• After you are paid, please exit the laboratory. 
27 
A
pe
nd
ix
 B
: T
hl
m
cr
ip
t 
Pl
ay
er
s 
Ac
tio
ns
 (e
,S,
S)
 
Bl
ue
-R
cd
 
Hi
, t
hi
s 
is 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
to
 R
ed
. {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2: 
16
 
PM
, B
lue
} 
W
e 
ha
ve
 to
 c
ho
os
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
on
e 
an
d 
co
nv
in
ce
 W
hi
te 
to
 a
lso
 {5
/23
/95
, 2
:2
7 
PM
, 
Bl
ue
} 
Ho
w 
do
 w
e 
do
 th
at 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:2
8 
PM
, 
Re
d} 
Te
ll 
w
hi
te 
th
at 
w
e 
ar
e 
pi
ck
in
g 
a 
cir
cle
 so
 h
e 
w
ill
 p
ro
ba
bly
 p
ick
 a
 c
irc
le 
th
in
ki
ng
 th
at 
w
e 
ar
e 
tri
ck
in
g 
him
. {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2:
29
 P
M
, R
ed
} 
W
on
't 
he
 th
in
k 
th
at 
is 
re
ve
rs
e 
ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
 
an
yw
ay
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:3
0 
PM
, B
lue
} 
M
ay
be
 it
 w
ill
 w
or
k 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:30
 P
M
, 
Bl
ue
} 
Sh
ou
ld 
I t
ell
 h
im
 w
e'
re
 p
ick
in
g 
cir
cle
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:31
 P
M
, B
lue
} 
If
 w
e 
te
ll 
him
 w
e 
ar
e 
pi
ck
in
g 
a 
cir
cle
 h
e 
w
ill
 th
in
k 
w
e 
ar
e 
pi
ck
in
g 
a 
sq
ua
re
 a
nd
 p
ick
 
th
e 
cir
cle
 s
o 
w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 p
ick
 th
e 
cir
cle
 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:32
 P
M
, R
ed
} 
ük
 1'1
1 d
o 
it 
on
 th
e 
op
en
 c
ha
nn
el 
{5
/23
/95
, 
2:
32
 P
M
, B
lue
} 
No
w 
w
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
he
'lI 
th
in
k 
{5
/23
/95
, 
2:3
3 
PM
, B
lue
} 
He
 is
 p
ro
ba
bly
 tr
yi
ng
 to
 fi
gu
re
 o
ut
 w
ha
t w
e 
Bl
ue
-W
hi
te
 
W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
w
e 
sh
ou
ld 
do
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:2
7 
PM
, W
hit
e} 
I r
ea
lly
 h
av
e 
no
 id
ea
, y
ou
 h
av
e 
th
e 
OO
5t 
ch
an
ce
 to
 w
in 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:28
 
PM
, B
lue
} 
Ho
w 
ar
e 
yo
u 
do
ing
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:39
 
PM
, B
lue
} 
I'm
 d
oin
g 
gr
ea
t {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2:
39
 P
M
, 
W
hit
e} 
Re
d-
W
hi
te 
"
Hi
 th
is 
is 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
 to
 w
hit
e"
 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:1
8 
PM
, R
ed
} 
W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
th
in
k 
w
e 
sh
ou
ld 
do
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:2
8 
PM
, W
hit
e} 
W
ha
t a
re
 y
ou
 g
oi
ng
 to
 p
ick
 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:33
 P
M
, R
ed
} 
Bl
ue
-R
ed
-W
hi
te
 
"
H
i, 
th
is 
is 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
 to
 b
oth
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
pl
ay
er
s"
 {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2:1
9 
PM
, W
hit
e} 
W
e'r
e 
go
in
g 
to
 p
ick
 c
irc
le 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:33
 
PM
, B
lue
} 
If
 bo
th 
o
f y
ou
 tr
y 
to
 p
ut
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 a
 5
0/5
0 
ch
an
ce
 o
f w
in
ni
ng
 
$7
.50
 ea
ch
 c
on
sid
er
in
g 
th
at 
I p
ut
 th
e 
op
po
sit
e. 
H
ow
ev
er
, i
f I
 ju
st 
pu
t w
ha
tev
er
 
I w
an
t, 
I c
an
 w
in 
15
$ 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:34
 
PM
, W
hit
e} 
M
y 
be
st 
ch
an
ce
 o
f w
in
ni
ng
 is
 to
 c
ho
os
e 
cir
cle
 o
r 
sq
ua
re
 w
ith
ou
t l
ett
in
g 
yo
u 
kn
ow
, s
o 
I t
hi
nk
 th
af
s w
ha
t I
'm
 g
oi
ng
 to
 
do
. G
oo
d 
Lu
ck
 w
ith
 y
ou
r g
ue
ss
 o
f w
ha
t 
I'm
 g
oi
ng
 to
 p
ick
. I
f y
ou
 h
av
e 
an
yt
hi
ng
 
to
 s
ay
 ju
st 
w
rit
e 
ba
ck
. {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2:
39
 
PM
, W
hit
e} 
Th
an
k 
go
od
ne
ss
 w
e 
do
n't
 k
no
w 
an
yo
ne
 
els
e 
in 
th
e 
gr
ou
p, 
hu
h?
 {5
/23
/95
, 2
:4
0 
PM
, B
lue
} 
Ye
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
I w
ou
ld 
be
 m
ad
 a
t y
ou
 fo
r 
no
t p
ick
in
g 
w
ha
t w
e 
pic
k. 
{5
/23
/95
,2:
41
 
PM
, R
ed
} 
I t
hi
nk
 I
 g
ot 
lu
ck
y 
to
da
y 
by
 s
itt
in
g 
in 
th
is 
ch
air
. I
 h
op
e 
it 
st
ick
s 
w
ith
 m
e 
af
ter
 
yo
u 
tw
o 
ch
oo
se
 y
ou
r c
irc
les
, o
r 
w
as
 it
 
sq
ua
re
s?
 {5
/23
/95
, 2
:4
2 
PM
, W
hit
e} 
ar
e 
re
al
ly
 p
ic
ki
ng
 {5
/23
/95
, 2
:3
4 
PM
, 
Re
d}
 
So
 w
e'
re
 d
ef
in
itl
y 
pi
ck
in
g 
cir
c1
e, 
rig
ht
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:3
4 
PM
, B
lu
e}
 
rig
ht
 th
er
e 
is 
50
/5
0 
ch
an
ce
, b
as
ic
al
ly
 h
e 
do
es
n'
t k
no
w
 w
ha
t w
e'
re
 p
ic
ki
ng
 w
ha
t i
f h
e 
th
in
ks
 w
e 
ar
e 
re
al
ly
 p
ic
ki
ng
 th
e 
cir
c1
e-
he
 
do
es
n't
 k
no
w
 a
bo
ut
 r
ev
er
se
 p
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:3
6 
PM
, R
ed
} 
M
ay
be
 n
ot
! 
N
ow
 w
e 
ha
ve
 to
 f
ig
ur
e 
o
u
t 
w
ha
t h
e 
th
in
ks
. 
Sh
ou
ld
 w
e 
ch
an
ge
 o
u
r 
m
in
ds
 to
 h
im
 f
or
 a
 b
it 
o
f c
o
n
fu
si
on
 a
n
d 
st
ill
 
pi
ck
 c
irc
1e
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:3
7 
PM
, B
lu
e}
 
M
ay
be
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 p
ic
k 
th
e 
sq
ua
re
, 
i c
an
't 
de
ci
de
 n
o
w
 {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2:
37
 P
M
, 
Re
d}
 
W
hy
 d
on
't 
w
e 
pa
ss
 m
es
sa
ge
s 
ba
ck
 a
n
d 
fo
rth
 
o
n
 t
he
 o
pe
n 
an
d 
di
re
ct
ly
 to
 h
im
 f
or
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
e 
re
st 
o
f t
he
 ti
m
e 
an
d 
st
ill
 p
ic
k 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
o
n
e,
 b
ut
 w
ith
 a
ll 
o
u
r 
m
es
sa
ge
s 
th
er
e's
 s
til
l a
 
50
/5
0 
ch
an
ce
 {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2:
38
 P
M
, B
lu
e}
 
If
 w
e 
ty
pe
 o
n
 t
he
 o
pe
n 
sc
re
en
 h
e'l
I 
kn
ow
 
w
ha
t w
e
 a
re
 tr
yi
ng
 to
 d
o.
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 ju
st 
de
ci
de
 w
ha
t w
e
 w
an
t 
to
 p
ic
k 
an
d 
ho
pe
 it
s 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 h
im
. 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:4
0 
PM
, R
ed
} 
Le
t's
 d
o 
it 
pr
iv
at
el
y 
th
en
 o
n
 t
he
 d
ire
ct
 to
 
w
hi
te
 c
ha
nn
el
 {
5/2
3/9
5, 
2:
41
 P
M
, 
Bl
ue
} 
So
 d
o 
w
 p
ic
k 
sq
ua
re
? 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:4
1 
PM
, 
Bl
ue
} 
W
ha
t d
o 
yo
u 
m
ea
n
, 
le
t's
 p
ic
k 
th
e 
cir
c1
e. 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:4
2 
PM
, R
ed
} 
ü
k 
{5
/23
/95
, 2
:4
2 
PM
, 
Bl
ue
} 
